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Comment on the SupplementalJurisdiction Statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1367
ARTHUR D. WoLF"

INTRODUCTION

In its short history, the supplemental-jurisdiction statute of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §
1367, has generated more commentary than perhaps any other jurisdictional
section. Together, § 1331, which traces its history to the Judiciary Act of 1875,
and § 1332, which dates back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, did not undoubtedly
promote more examination in their first eight years of existence. One might
speculate why § 1367 has been the focus of so much commentary, largely critical:
critical of the speed with which § 1367 was enacted, critical of the narrow range
of persons involved in its drafting, critical of its scope, and critical of particular
subsections, such as § 1367(b), which limits the use of supplemental jurisdiction
in diversity and alienage controversies. While the scholarly literature has served
the useful purpose of targeting areas of the statute that may need to be
reconsidered, it has, to some degree, obscured the many benefits the statute has
wrought. This Comment has three goals: (1) to examine the benefits achieved
through the enactment of § 1367, (2) to explore the genuine policy issues that
underlie the critical commentary, and (3) to suggest, in general terms, subsections
that might benefit from amendment.
I. BENEFITS OF § 1367

Congress enacted the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, it should be recalled,
in the wake of Finley v. UnitedStates' and the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee,2 composed of a highly regarded panel ofjudges, law professors, and
practitioners appointed to examine various aspects of the federaljudiciary. In the
wake of Finley, the Committee and others3 were concerned that the Court would
soon jettison supplemental jurisdiction altogether because Justice Scalia's

* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; LL.B., Columbia
University, 1965; A.B., Tufts University, 1962. From 1973-78, Professor Wolf served as
special counsel to Representative Robert F. Drinan, a member of the House Judiciary
Committee. Together with other consultants, he also served as an advisor to Representative
Robert W. Kastenmeier, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice, in the early stages of the development of the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute.
Professor Wolf expresses his deep appreciation to Professor John Egnal, a friend and fellow
traveler to many arcane comers of federal jurisdiction, for his helpful insights and comments

on earlier drafts.
1. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
2. FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY COMMrr'
(1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMrEE REPORT].

3. See, e.g., Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise ofPendentandAncillaryJurisdiction,1990
BYU L. REv. 247.
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majority opinion contained some ominous sounds.4 After all, the federal courts
had, without guidance or direction from Congress, created supplemental
jurisdiction (formerly pendent and ancillary jurisdictions) out of the "case" or
"controversy" language of Article III.
Both before and after its landmark decision in UnitedMine Workers v. Gibbs,6
the Supreme Court referred to the doctrine as judicially created.7 For example, in
Murphy v. John Hofman Co.,8 a pre-Gibbs decision involving ancillary
jurisdiction, as it was then called, the Court stated: "In the courts of the United
States this ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised, though it is not authorizedby
any statute."9 Similarly, in PennhurstState School & Hospitalv. Halderman, °
a post-Gibbs decision, the Court noted that "pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made
doctrine inferred from the general language of Art. III."" Later in the same
opinion, Justice Powell observed that "pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made
doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general Art. III language
conferring power to hear all 'cases' arising under federal law or between diverse
parties." 12
The Supreme Court created supplemental jurisdiction out of the general
language of Article III in the face of its holdings, statements, and dicta that
Congress decides on the scope of federal court jurisdiction. In judicially creating
supplemental jurisdiction prior to the 1990 statute by placing it on Article III
grounds, the Court altered the usual jurisdictional analysis it has articulated

4. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 549. In Finley, the Court sought to reconstruct the judicially
created doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction upon a statutory footing. The Court foreshadowed
this change of direction inAldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), and Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger,437 U.S. 365 (1978).

5. U.S. CoNST. art. HI, § 2.
6. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
7. See generally Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, ProceduralCommon Law,
FederalJurisdictionalPolicy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State

Grounds Doctrine,86 COLUM. L. REv. 1291 (1986) (exploring the concept ofjudicially created
rules ofjurisdiction in a broader context); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion,60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985) (same).
8. 211 U.S. 562 (1909). The Court's holding in Murphy derived from its earlier decision
in Freemanv. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
9. Murphy, 211 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added). The newly enacted § 1367 combines
"ancillary jurisdiction" with "pendent jurisdiction" to form "supplemental jurisdiction." 28
U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
10. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
11. Id, at 117.
12. Id. at 120 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545 (1974)); see also Gibbs, 383
U.S. at 725. In relying on "the general Article III language" as the basis for supplemental
jurisdiction, the Court has not drawn any distinction between "cases" and "controversies," the
critical words in Article III. Arguably "cases" could have a narrower meaning than
"controversies" since "cases" are tied to federal sources of law, while "controversies" refer to
disputes involving designated parties. Thus, an Article III "case" arguably is only as broad as
the federal claim or question (including the facts or transaction upon which it is based) that
confers the jurisdiction, while an Article III "controversy" could include the whole range of
claims and questions that are in dispute between designated parties that determine jurisdiction.
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through the years 3 in two significant respects. First, the Court has insisted that
federal courts address non-constitutional state or federal grounds of decision
before addressing constitutional questions.' In Burton v. United States, "Sthe
Court stated that "[iut is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case."' 6 If
the jurisdictional statute, say, in Gibbs 7 (the Taft-Hartley Act) did not authorize
supplemental jurisdiction, then the Court should not have addressed the scope of
a constitutional "case" in Article III. With the possible exception of Finley," the
Court has never addressed this statutory question in supplemental-jurisdiction
cases.
Second, the Court has long stated that the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
including the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, is governed by
statute. 9 In 1799, the Court stated that "the political truth is, that the disposal of
the judicial power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress ...
[and] congress is not bound.., to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts,
to every subject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant."2 Almost
fifty years later, the Court iterated that federal courts "must look to the statute as
the warrant for their authority; certainly they cannot go beyond the statute, and
assert an authority with which they may not be invested by it, or which may be
clearly denied to them."'" In Gibbs,the Supreme Court ignored the statutory basis
for jurisdiction in the federal courts and moved directly to the scope of an Article
III "case."
Consequently, the enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute in 1990
settled the question whether the courts would continue to define the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction or abandon it altogether. By codifying the doctrine in

13. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The
Osborn "two-step" has governed jurisdictional analysis for 175 years. First, the court should
determine whether the jurisdictional statute authorizes the federal court to entertain the claim,
suit, bill, or civil action in dispute. Second, if so, the court should then determine whether the
statute is constitutional.
14. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (addressing federal statutory ground);
Sler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (discussing state law ground). But
see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (addressing
constitutional questions before addressing the statutory issue).
15. 196 U.S. 283 (1905).
16. Idat 295; accordTownship of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629 (1946);
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930).
17. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
18. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
19. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (discussing lower federal court
jurisdiction); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (addressing the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction). For the view that the Constitution limits the power of Congress
to control federal court jurisdiction, see generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:
ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authorityto Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). For the status of the current debate between these two
positions, see generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 358-87 (4th ed. 1996).
20. Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.l (1799) (parenthetical in original).
21. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
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§ 1367, Congress enabled the federal courts to continue entertaining a variety of

claims (i.e., claims, counter-claims, cross-claims, and third-party claims) that do
not have an independent basis ofjurisdiction. While the original proposal sought
to cabin that authority short of the constitutional limits of Article III and to define
its scope, the final version of the statute left open both the scope and the
constitutional limits of supplemental jurisdiction.
Thus, with the enactment of the statute, Congress achieved several important
objectives. First, by codifying supplemental jurisdiction, it harmonized the
doctrine with all other jurisdictional grants that are in statutory form.' Second,
by defining supplemental jurisdiction in Article III terms, Congress signaled a
desire to extend the doctrine as far as the Constitution allows. Third, by giving
the courts the power to define further the scope of the jurisdiction, Congress

continued the "common law" or more accurately the "judge-made law" tradition

of supplemental jurisdiction. 3 Fourth, Congress altered the approach of Gibbs
that "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right."'24 If
a litigant satisfies the criteria for jurisdiction under subsection (a), then the
district court "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims ..
"..25
Thus, Congress converted a doctrine of judicial discretion to a claim of right,
even though it retained some discretion, in § 1367(c), for the courts to dismiss
supplemental claims.
II. POLICY ISSUES

While the statute admirably advances these important objectives, it does raise
a variety of policy issues that should be addressed in revisiting the statute.
26
Professor John Oakley's draft of a revised statute for the America Law Institute
("ALI") and the articles in this Journal go far in the direction of identifying and
proposing solutions to the perceived problems in current law. Although the
discussion here may overlap the other contributions to this Symposium, it will
also seek to move off in different directions. Four areas of policy need to be
addressed as the statute is evaluated for amendment: (1) the scope of discretion
§ 1367 gives to federal judges, (2) the statutory treatment of diversity cases, (3)
the degree to which § 1367 supersedes all other grants of supplemental

22. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1368 (1994).
23. In this sense, the statute looks like section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994), as the Supreme Court read it in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In that decision, the Court
interpreted what appeared to be ajurisdiction-granting section of Taft-Hartley to confer upon
the federal courts the authority to develop a federal common law governing collective
bargaining agreements. See generally Donald Doemberg, JuridicalChameleons in the "New
Erie" Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 759; Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the
FederalCourts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 805 (1989).

24. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
26. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, COUNCIL

DRAFr No. 2 (1997) [hereinafter C.D. No. 2]. The ALI approved this draft in May 1998.
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jurisdiction, and (4) the impact of the statute on the Burford, Pullman, and
Colorado River abstention doctrines.
A. JudicialDiscretion

First, § 1367 gives the federal courts much discretion in the use of
supplemental jurisdiction. Such discretion appears in several critical areas of the
statute. For example, the fundamental scope of the jurisdiction is within the
discretion of the courts. Subsection (a) of the statute assigns to the courts the
question whether the supplemental claim is "so related to claims in the [existing]
action within such 6riginal jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."'27 The legislative
history indicates that these words are designed to codify the ruling in Gibbs,2
thus leaving to the courts the power to decide the scope of Article III, and, thus
the scope of the statute. The original bill had a more narrow formulation, phrased
in terms of the "same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences,"29 the traditional and well-worn language of the federal rules.3"
Second, the statute gives the federal courts the discretion to dismiss
supplemental claims even though they are within the scope of the statute.
Subsection (c) identifies four grounds for such discretionary dismissals: (1) when
the supplemental claim involves a "novel or complex" question rooted in state
law,3 (2) when the supplemental claim "substantially predominates" over the
jurisdiction-conferring claim,32 (3) when the district court has dismissed the
jurisdiction-conferring claim,33 and (4) in "exceptional circumstances," when the
court finds "other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 34
While Gibbs suggests that, if at least some of the above criteria are met, the
supplemental claims "should be dismissed"35 or "may fairly be dismissed"36 or
"jurisdiction should ordinarily be refused,"37 the statute uses "may" which seems
to expand the discretion of the court to retain rather than dismiss the supplemental
claim. On the other hand, Gibbs could be read as an open-ended invitation for
courts to exercise their power to dismiss supplemental claims whenever
appropriate so that the statute might be viewed as narrowing such discretion since
it allows such exercises in only four limited circumstances. Further, the source for
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
28. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 715.
29. Arthur D. Wolf, Codification ofSupplementalJurisdiction:Anatomy of a Legislative

Proposal,14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 55 (1992) (the proposed § 1367(a)(1)(B)).
30. See, e.g., FED. R. CIrv. P. 10(b), 13(a), 13(b), 13(g), 14(a), 14(c), 20(a); see also 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330(c), 1607(b), 2415(f), 3012 (1994) (statutory use of the phrase "transaction or
occurrence").
31.28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). This provision could be read to impact the application of the
Burford,Pullman, and ColoradoRiver abstention doctrines. See infrapp. 236-37.

32. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
33. See id. § 1367(c)(3).
34. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
35. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
36. Id. at 727.
37. Id
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the exercise of discretion based on a "novel or complex" issue of state law is not
clear from the legislative history. Gibbs, which the statute principally codifies,
did not address this limitation on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
Third, the restriction on a supplemental claim that "substantially predominates"
derives directly from Gibbs. But that limit was shaky from the start. Why should
it matter whether the supplemental claim substantially predominates over the
jurisdiction-conferring claim? If it is properly in federal court, then the plaintiff
should be entitled to litigate it there together with the jurisdiction-conferring
claim. For example, in Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsInc. v. Thompson,38 the
plaintiffs alleged six claims, only one of which could have conferred jurisdiction
on the federal court on removal.39 Had the Supreme Court accepted the lower
court's reading of Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,4" the federal district
court would have had "arising under" jurisdiction over one of the plaintiffs' six
claims. Despite the important federal question that one jurisdiction-conferring
claim raised, the federal court would have dismissed the other five claims because
they "substantially predominate[d]" over the jurisdiction-conferring claim under
Gibbs or under subsection (c)(2) of the statute.
Yet the potential federal questions in Merrell Dow were quite important:
whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and its implementing
regulations provided implied rights of action for injured parties, and whether a
state claim that incorporates an essential federal element "arises under" federal
law. Had the plaintiffs in Merrell Dow prevailed on either of these questions
(only the second was contested), the district court would have dismissed the
remaining five counts, compelling the plaintiffs to dismiss the federal claim and
refile in state court (or litigate the federal claim in state court on remand).
In addition, diversity cases present particularly difficult circumstances for the
exercise of subsection (c)(2) discretion since all the claims in the "controversy"
will be state-based. Thus, the reasoning based on federalism that guided the Gibbs
court in formulating this limitation (as well as the other restrictions) for federal
question cases has no place in the analysis of civil actions based on diversity
because the jurisdictional grant assumes the litigation of state claims in federal
court. On the other hand, if the basis for diversity jurisdiction is the apprehended
discrimination against non-residents, then supplemental claims between citizens
of the forum state would appropriately be subject to subsection (c)(2) dismissal.
But the statute leaves the drawing of these lines to the discretion of the courts,
unguided by the statute or its legislative history.
The subsection (c)(2) limitation seems, in effect, to readopt the approach to
federal court jurisdiction taken in the Judiciary Act of 1875,"' when Congress first
permanently provided for general federal-question jurisdiction. That statute
authorized the federal trial courts to dismiss an original suit or remand a removed

38. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
39. As a citizen of Ohio, the forum state, Merrell Dow could not remove the action because
of the "in-state resident" provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994), although the "alien"
plaintiffs could have commenced the civil action in the district court under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2) (1994).
40. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
41. Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
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suit to state court if "it shall appear to the satisfaction of said [federal] court, at
any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does
not really andsubstantiallyinvolve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of said [federal] court."4 The Gibbs discretionary approach, partly
codified in § 1367(c), in essence reinstitutes the approach of the 1875 statute by
giving the federal courts the discretion to dismiss the supplemental claims if they
substantially predominate, which is another way of saying that the civil action
"does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly"
within the court's jurisdiction.
Fourth, the statute gives the judges discretion to dismiss supplemental claims
when the court has dismissed the jurisdiction-conferring claim.43 Unfortunately
neither the statute nor the legislative history provides any guidelines on the
exercise of this discretion. Of course, the decisional law has developed some
standards to determine the appropriate occasions for exercising this discretion,
which the statute or legislative history might well have adopted (or could in the
future codify). For example, some courts will assess the stage at which the
jurisdiction-conferring claim is dismissed, " including if discovery has occurred,
motions for summary judgment denied, pre-trial conferences had, and other
matters relating to the point in the proceedings at which the court dismissed the
jurisdiction-conferring claims. This approach is consistent with the Gibbs
admonition that supplemental jurisdiction is designed to advance "considerations
of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."4 But the statute
continues to permit the judges to decide the occasions for the exercise of their
discretion without much legislative guidance.
Fifth, the last category for discretionary dismissal of supplemental claims is a
catch-all that gives the courts unguided discretion to dismiss supplemental claims
in "extraordinary circumstances" when the court finds "other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction."46 As introduced, H.R. 53 81 did not have a catch-all
provision." The substitute that Judge Weis offered at the hearing on the bill
contained a more generous catch-all which authorized dismissal of any
supplemental claim when "there are other appropriate reasons, such as judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants, for declining jurisdiction."48
When Alan Morrison of the Nader Organization, Public Citizens, Inc., objected
to the breadth of the Weis catch-all, the subcommittee developed the narrower
formulation of current law.49

42. lI at 472 (emphasis added). In 1948 Congress removed this language from the statute
"as unnecessary" when it revised and recodified title 28 (the Judicial Code). PAUL M. BATOR
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 837 (2d ed.
1973) (quoting from the legislative history of the 1948 recodification of Title 28).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1994).
44. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
45. Id at 726.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
47. See Wolf, supra note 29, at 55-56.
48. Id. at 57; see also id. at 58 (Rowe-Burbank-Mengler Proposal).

49. Conversation with Charles Geyh, Counsel for the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice (Nov. 1990).
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Finally, stepping back to evaluate the judicial discretion given in subsection
(c), what emerges is an extensive power to dismiss supplemental claims that
clearly are within subsection (a). When coupled with the broad authority
conferred upon the courts under subsection (a) to define the reach of Article III,
the statute is really an expansive delegation of congressional power to determine
the scope of the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts. Dissenting in
Cannon v. University of Chicago,5" Justice Powell observed: "Under Art. III,
Congress alone has the responsibility for determining the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts."'" If so, the delegation in § 1367 may well be unconstitutional. On
the other hand, if § 1367 is viewed as a congressional definition ofjurisdiction,
with the courts simply performing their ordinary interpretive function, the statute
is perfectly permissible. Alternatively, assuming Congress may delegate to the
judiciary its legislative power to determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
the question arises whether Congress has properly done so."
B. Diversity Issue
The current statute treats supplemental claims in diversity controversies
differently than it treats supplemental claims in all other civil actions. More
precisely, if a civil action is based "solely" on § 1332, subsection (b) of § 1367
restricts the plaintiff's opportunity to assert supplemental claims.53 Congress
could have legislated otherwise since it is not a matter of constitutional
compulsion. For example, it could have given "diversity" plaintiffs the same
opportunities to assert supplemental claims as it gave "federal question"
plaintiffs. Congress chose to impose the restrictions because it wanted to codify
the pre-Finley case law. It purported to "implement the principal rationale of
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)", 4 in adopting
subsection (b), which imposed limits on the diversity plaintiffs use of
supplemental jurisdiction. Since the 1990 supplemental-jurisdiction bill advanced
only because it met the House Judiciary Committee's test of "noncontroversial,"5 5 the drafters of the bill sought to reflect, as they viewed it, the
current state of the law in 1990. Because of these limitations on the legislative
process, the drafters' necessarily took a somewhat conservative approach, seeking
simply to reflect the decisional law.
Despite the drafters' understandable caution in formulating § 1367(b), the
critics of the supplemental-jurisdictional statute have focused much of their

50. 441 U.S. 677, 730-731 (1979).
51. Id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (Congress
may assign Article III "judicial power" to a non-Article III tribunal.). See generally A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Congress may not excessively
delegate its "legislative power" to the executive branch.).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
54. H.R. REP.NO. 101-734, at 29 n.16 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875.
55. See Wolf, supra note 29, at 17.
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attacks on it.56 The criticism has become something of a cottage industry. It has
ranged from attacks upon the good faith of the drafters to bad policy choices
through misreading of precedents and sloppy drafting. Considering the
circumstances under which the supplemental-jurisdiction section of the 1990 bill
advanced and the press of time in which that occurred, it is remarkable that
subsection (b), on the whole, does embrace "the principal rationale" of Kroger,
at least one could reasonably so assert.5 7
To be sure, the courts have struggled with aspects of subsection (b), especially
when its terms conflict with its legislative history. For example, in In re Abbott
Laboratories,"the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute overrules
the holding in Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo. 9 that each member of a class must
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, even though the legislative history
states that Zahn is preserved.' Both the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have
interpreted § 1367(b) to allow a co-plaintiff to assert a claim less than $75,000
against a diverse defendant even though Zahn prohibited such claims. But an
apparent conflict between the language of a statute and the intent of the drafters
as otherwise revealed is not new. For example, the Supreme Court addressed that
issue many years ago in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States6' and more
recently in Houston v. Lack 2 and UnitedSteelworkers v. Weber 3 In some cases,
the courts have decided on the basis of the "plain meaning" of the statute, while
in others they have decided on the basis of the otherwise discovered intent of the
drafters. Although the legislature should avoid such apparent or real conflict, the
conflict should be seen as an occasional by-product of the legislative process.
After all, courts sometimes write decisions that have conflicting and inconsistent
language.
Both the critics and defenders of subsection (b), however, need to move beyond
the debate over origin and text to focus on the central policy issue: whether
plaintiffs in civil actions based "solely" on § 1332 should be treated differently
from other plaintiffs, even when they are in a defensive posture (such as
responding to counterclaims or third-party claims). Surely if the plaintiff
commences the civil action in state court and the defendant removes the action

56. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping At Burnt Straws: The
Disasterof the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMoRY L.J. 963 (1991); Richard D.
Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the
SupplementalJurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991).
57. See generally Thomas M. Mengler, et al., CongressAccepts Supreme Court'sInvitation
to Codify SupplementalJurisdiction,74 JUDICATURE 213 (1991).
58.51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (class action); accordStromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mechanical, Inc, 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996) (nonclass action).
59. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
60. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 & n.17 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6875.
61. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
62. 487 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1988).
63. 443 U.S. 193, 200-08 (1979).
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into federal court, the plaintiff should not be penalized by the removal."
Although the 1990 amendment to § 1441(c) purports to address part of this issue,
it apparently has not succeeded in resolving the removal problems.65
In the past, bills that would have abolished diversity jurisdiction have not
become public law. Some have even passed the House of Representatives after
full debate only to fail in the Senate after full consideration. One could read this
legislative history as an expression of congressional intent not to treat diversity
plaintiffs differently. Thus to restrict diversity jurisdiction indirectly through the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute may simply reflect the necessary haste in which
Congress enacted § 1367. As noted earlier, that Congress should take this
restrictive approach in the truncated and abbreviated consideration of the
supplemental-jurisdiction provision in the 1990 bill is understandable. Congress
now needs, however, to reconsider this aspect of the statute in light of its past
indisposition not to restrict severely the exercise of diversity jurisdiction.
Some commentators have noted one area of "obvious" need for change: where
the original plaintiff is in a "defensive" posture in responding to a defendant's
counterclaim or a third-party defendant's claim. Making that change, however,
does not address the more fundamental point that diversity plaintiffs should have
equal access to supplemental jurisdiction so long as Congress retains § 1332.
While it achieves some fairness in the application of supplemental jurisdiction in
§ 1332 controversies, such reform falls far short of the need to address the
asserted distortion § 1367(b) effects with regard to § 1332.
Revisiting § 1367(b) should also lead Congress to reexamine the complete
diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,6 an exploration it has infrequently
undertaken. Strawbridge has had its detractors. Chief Justice Marshall, who
authored the cryptic opinion, "repeatedly expressed regret"67 over the decision.
In 1844, the Supreme Court thought Congress had enacted a statute in 1839
"exclusively with an intent to rid the courts of the decision."6 Despite the
protests, Strawbridge has persisted through the years, perhaps because it has

64. Professor Steinman, in this Symposium and elsewhere, has addressed the application
of § 1367 to removed cases. See, e.g., Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdictionin §71441
Removed Cases: An Unsurveyed Frontier of Congress' Handiwork, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 305
(1993). In addition, the original supplemental-jurisdiction bill expressly covered removed
cases. See Wolf, supranote 29, at 55.
65. See Wolf, supra note 29, at 35-38.
66. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
67. Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555
(1844).
68. Id.
at 556. Professor Hartnett has taken a more narrow view of the Court's statements
in Letson regarding Strawbridge,asserting that neither Chief Justice Marshall's suggestions
nor the 1839 statute was directed at the complete diversity rule. See Edward Hartnett, A New
Trickfrom an Old and Abused Dog: Section 1441(c) Lives andNow Permits the Remand of
FederalQuestion Cases, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1099, 1111 n.60 (1995). Dicta incases decided
after Letson seem to supportProfessor Hartnett's observations. See Clearwater v. Meredith, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 489, 493 (1859); Northern Ind. R.R. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 56 U.S. (15
How.) 233, 244 (1854).
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become a part of the diversity statute. 9 Since the Strawbridgedecision in 1806,
Congress has codified and recodified the diversity statute on three occasions, and
has amended it many other times. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held
that Congress is presumed to adopt the then current judicial interpretation of a
statute when Congress reenacts or codifies it.7" An in-depth, free-wheeling, and
robust debate over the continuing vitality of Strawbridgeis long overdue.
Although the legislative history of § 1367 makes no reference to Strawbridge,7'
the expressed intent to codify the "principal rationale" of Kroger,presumably the
rule of complete diversity, would seem implicitly to accept it.72 Nonetheless, the
text of § 1367 could be read to overrule Strawbridge,as courts have read it to
overrule Zahn. Thus, assuming that two plaintiffs commence a civil action against
a defendant, who is diverse only from one of the plaintiffs, the nondiverse
plaintiff could, by invoking § 1367(a), assert a supplemental claim against the
nondiverse defendant. Subsection (b) would be inapplicable on its face because
the nondiverse co-plaintiff is not asserting a claim "against persons made
parties" '73 under a variety of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The next issue would be whether the predicate language of subsection (a) would
bar the claim because of the operation of § 1332. In other words, would or should
a court read the "[e]xcept . . .as expressly provided otherwise by Federal
statute"'74 to bar the claim? Since subsection (b) expressly covers actions based
on § 1332, the nondiverse co-plaintiff would argue that, if its claim is not barred
by the specific text of subsection (b), which is designed for § 1332 actions, then
it should not be barred by the general language of exclusion in subsection (a).
C. Supersession
The third policy question that the current statute raises is whether it should state
the rules for supplemental jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other statutory
provisions. The original bill contained language designed to make § 1367 the
exclusive source of supplemental jurisdiction, except when a federal statute
"expressly provides otherwise."75 To effectuate the goal of exclusivity, however,
Congress would have to amend or repeal all sections of the United States Code,
such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 1338(b), and 1441(c) that authorize supplemental
jurisdiction. It would not necessarily have to repeal all provisions that expressly
limit it, such as 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4), although concentrating all
supplemental-jurisdiction provisions in § 1367 is a good idea. If all power to add

69. But see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In overruling the 96 year-old
precedent of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), the Erie Court reinterpreted the Rules
of Decision Act (RDA), although Congress had also codified and reenacted the RDA at least
twice after the decision in Swift.
70. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,384-86 (1983). But see Erie, 304
U.S. at 79-80; Mengler, supra note 3, at 260-67 (rejecting this ratification or adoption theory).
71. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-734 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860.
72. See id.at 29 n.16, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
75. Wolf, supranote 29, at 56 (proposed § 1367(h)).
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supplemental claims were concentrated in one section of Title 28, the life of
federal court judges and litigators would be eased considerably.
As discussed earlier, the current statute permits the continued use of judgemade law to define the parameters of supplemental jurisdiction. The statute does
not eliminate the need for "federal common law."'76 The absence of clarity of the
relationship between § 1367 and, say, § 1338(b) means that parties and courts
will need to spend additional time resolving these ambiguities. Section 1338(b)
authorizes plaintiffs asserting claims under the federal copyright, trademark, plant
variety protection, or patent acts to assert supplemental claims based on "unfair
competition.""
Assume, for example, that a plaintiff, in a trademark action arising under the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act,78 wishes to assert a supplemental claim based on a state
anti-dilution statute. Arguably that claim is not within § 1338(b) because it
applies only to unfair competition claims. The anti-dilution claim might also not
be within § 1367(a) because it excludes supplemental claims when "expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute,"79 here § 1338(b). Of course, the
"expressly provided otherwise" language could be read to require that the federal
statute, claimed to limit the reach of § 1367(a), must specifically disclaim §
1367(a) as a basis for supplemental claims. For example, the Civil Rights
Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act expressly excludes supplemental
jurisdiction "over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce,
alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree."8 On
the other hand, the "expressly provided otherwise" language of § 1367(a) could
be read to mean that the other federal statute simply authorizes supplemental
claims. If so, then the plaintiffs anti-dilution claim could fall into the lacuna
between § 1338(b) and § 1367(a). To avoid problems such as these, § 1367
should be made the exclusive source in the United States Code for supplemental
claims.
Although the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended the repeal of §
1441(c) of Title 28,81 the 1990 act only amended the subsection to restrict its
application to supplemental claims when joined with "a separate and independent
claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 ....
.82
It is thus unavailable to a defendant wishing to remove a diversity case. In such
cases, § 1441(a) would govern the scope of removal, which implicates § 1367(a)
because removal is tied to original jurisdiction of the district courts. The problem,
of course, is that § 1367(b), which limits the scope of supplemental jurisdiction

76. See

ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION ch.

WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL

6 (2d ed. 1994); CHARLES ALAN
COURTS § 60 (5th ed. 1994). See generally commentators listed

supranote 23.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1994).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994).
81. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, pt. II, at 94-95. The Committee
recommended the repeal of § 1441(c) so long as Congress retained the general diversity
jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994).
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in diversity cases, is tied to cases based "solely" on § 1332. A removed diversity
action is not based solely on § 1332 since § 1441 authorizes the removal from
state to federal court. Although the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
applied § 1367 to removed actions generally, perhaps they should not apply
subsection (b), which is designed to inhibit diversity plaintiffs who choose the
federal court, not those who are forced there by removal.
The matter devolves into the question of the role § 1441(c) plays for
supplemental claims in removed cases. Because the Supreme Court has
interpreted the "separate and independent" phrase to exclude state and federal
claims based on "a single wrong, '8' 3 § 1441(c) has little practical utility in the
world of supplemental claims. It could, however, be the Rule 18(a) 4 equivalent
in removed cases when the jurisdiction-conferring claim is rooted in § 1331. That
is, since plaintiffs, under Rule 18(a), can join in one action any claims they have
against the defendant (even if unrelated, assuming proper subject matter
jurisdiction), defendants could remove any case where the plaintiff has joined
such unrelated claims in state court since such unrelated claims would qualify as
"separate and independent" under § 1441(c). If Gibbs and now § 1367(a) describe
the outer limits of a constitutional "case," then § 1441(c) is unconstitutional
because the unrelated claims would, by definition, not arise out of"a common
nucleus of operative fact," 5 the presumed constitutional sine qua non.
On the other hand, if the "ordinarily be expected to try" 6 language of Gibbs is
an alternative formulation of the limits for a constitutional "case," then § 144 1(c),
when interpreted to allow the removal of unrelated claims, would be
constitutional so long as the plaintiff would be expected to try the claims in one
lawsuit. It may be too that Gibbs does not define the outer limits of Article III,
even when analyzed as proposing two alternative formulations for a constitutional
"case." If the Gibbs definitions fall short of the constitutional limits, then
Congress has some latitude to allow unrelated, supplemental claims to be asserted
in federal court either in an original action or on removal under § 1441 (a) and
(c). Furthermore, Gibbs purported only to define a "case" under Article III; it said
nothing about a "controversy," although judges and scholars have generally
assumed they mean the same thing.8 7
The natural meaning of "controversy" is broader than "case," just as "case" is
broader than "suit"8 8 (or even "civil action"). A "controversy" between two
parties connotes a dispute having one or more facets to it, not one necessarily
growing out of one incident. On the other hand, a "case" arising under federal law
must have at least some of its roots in a federal source, and seems tied to a
common event. If "controversy" is broader than "case," then the 1990 amendment
to § 1441(c) should have limited its reach to § 1332, not § 1331, civil actions.

83. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a).
85. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
86. Id.
87. But see supra note 12; Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-FederalistView ofArticle III: Separating
the Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985).
88. See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143 (1880) (Miller, J., dissenting).
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D. Abstention
Section 1367 may have inadvertently affected the Burford, 9 Pullman,9" and
Colorado River9 abstention doctrines. The statute does not seem to affect
Younger92 abstention. The legislative history of the statute does not make any
reference to its possible impact on abstention. First, Burford abstention requires
the federal court to dismiss federal and state claims that grow out of and are
connected to a complex state regulatory scheme "of substantial public import."9 3
Section 1367 appears to affect Burford abstention in two ways: subsection (c)(1)
would give the court discretion to dismiss a "complex" state claim while Burford
requires it; and § 1367 would appear to require the federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over the jurisdiction-conferring federal claim unless the plaintiff
takes a voluntary dismissal under subsection (d),94 while Burford requires
dismissal of the federal claim as well as the state claim.
Second, Pullman abstention authorizes a federal court to postpone decision on
a "novel" question of state law, when joined with a federal constitutional claim.
In such instances, the federal court directs the parties to secure an interpretation
of state law from a state court; state certification procedures are frequently
employed to obtain that interpretation. 95 Section 1367 seems to alter Pullman
abstention in a fundamental way. Subsection (c)(1) authorizes the federal court
to dismiss, not simply postpone entering judgment on, the "novel" state claim.
Thus, under § 1367(c)(1), the federal court, in a Pullman abstention case, would
never have the opportunity to enter judgment on the novel state claim when the
court dismisses it prior to final judgment. This approach also infringes the
Supreme Court's regular admonition that federal courts should not reach federal
constitutional questions unless no other ground is available for decision.96
Third, although ColoradoRiver insists that abstention is the exception to the
general rule that federal courts must exercise the jurisdiction Congress confers
upon them, it nonetheless approved dismissal of a civil action the United States
commenced in its own courts based on federal and state law. Under § 1367, the
state law aspect of the Government's claims in a case like ColoradoRiver could
be dismissed either because it is "novel or complex"97 or because it "substantially
predominates"98 over the federal aspects. In addition, courts could use the open-

89. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
90. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
91. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
92. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
93. ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. at 814.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
95. See, e.g., S.J.C. RULE 1:03 Mass. (1998) (Uniform Certification of Questions of Law).
See generally Beth A. Hardy, Certification Before Facial Invalidation: A Return to
Federalism, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 217 (1990).
96. See, e.g., Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1904); Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 410 (1886).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1).
98. Id. § 1367(c)(2).
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ended authorization of dismissal of the supplemental claim in subsection (c)(4)9 9
to reach the same result as in ColoradoRiver in a much wider array of cases or
controversies.
Furthermore, if one or more subparagraphs of subsection (c) are viewed as
adopting or incorporating then current (1990) judicial interpretations of the
abstention doctrine, then ColoradoRiver dismissal could become the rule, not the
exception as Justice Brennan contemplated.' 0 Even though subsection (c) is
designed for dismissal only of the supplemental claim, such dismissal will often
lead to a voluntary dismissal of the federal claim under subsection (d) to permit
litigation of all claims in one forum.
III.

SUGGESTED REVISIONS FOR §

1367

The commentators in this Symposium and Professor Oakley's work for the
American Law Institute ("ALl") ' have suggested a series of amendments for a
revised supplemental-jurisdiction statute. One of Professor Oakley's innovations
would be to define the jurisdiction in terms of a "claim" rather than a "civil
action," a reform long overdue for all federal jurisdictional statutes. Without
tracking what he and others have proposed here and elsewhere, this Comment
offers a few suggestions for possible revision of § 1367.
First, the scope of supplemental jurisdiction, as defined in § 1367(a), needs to
be clarified and made more specific. The Federal Courts Study Committee
suggested that its scope be framed in the familiar words of the civil rules: the
same transaction or occurrence. The original bill tracked this proposal very
closely, and could be the basis for a revised statute. While this definition would
fall short of the full reach of Article III, it would make clear that supplemental
claims must be closely related to the jurisdiction-conferring claim in all cases or
controversies. It surely should not be as broad as, say, Rule 18.
Second, judicial discretion under § 1367(c) to dismiss supplemental claims at
any time should be eliminated altogether or severely restricted by a time bar.
Dismissal of supplemental claims directly affects the invocation of original
jurisdiction since a plaintiff whose supplemental claims are dismissed is under
pressure to refile the entire action in state court, thus foregoing the right to
litigate the jurisdiction-conferring claim in federal court. Needless to say, if the
plaintiff is compelled to bring the jurisdiction-conferring claim in the federal
court because of exclusive jurisdiction, then the dismissal of the supplemental
claim requires litigation in two forums. Further, if a supplemental claim is
"novel," the district court should use the well-worn mechanism of certifying the
state law question to the highest state court for resolution, allowing the parties,
if they choose, to return to federal court, as in Pullman abstention. Alternatively,
subsection (c) dismissals should be subject to a time limitation, say, ninety days
after the pleading asserting the supplemental claim is filed. The courts could
dismiss supplemental claims within that time frame for the reasons set out in §

99. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
100. But see In re Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995).
101. See C.D. No. 2, supra note 26.
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1367(c), but not thereafter. Such a time limitation on discretionary dismissals
would reflect decisional law, such as Gibbs, 2 where the Court allowed the entry
of judgment solely on the state law claims after all the federal claims had been
dismissed.
Third, diversity plaintiffs should be treated the same as other plaintiffs. If
Congress wishes to restrict their access to the federal courts, it should not do so
through the artificial device of limiting supplemental claims. While this author
supports abolition of diversity jurisdiction altogether, with the possible exception
of interpleader and mass tort litigation, diversity plaintiffs should not be
disadvantaged unless Congress chooses to do so directly. In addition, alienage
controversies should not automatically be lumped together with civil actions
between citizens of different states. 3 The drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789
may have viewed federal court jurisdiction over alienage disputes as "the single
most important grant of national court jurisdiction"' ' authorized in the statute.
Fourth, with regard to supersession, Congress should clearly make § 1367 the
exclusive authority for supplemental claims, whatever their source and however
they entered the federal court. The scope of supplemental jurisdiction should not
vary simply because a claim is rooted in a particular statute. To effectuate this
proposal, Congress would need to repeal all other provisions in the United States
Code which authorize supplemental jurisdiction, such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b),
1338(b), and 1441(c).
Fifth, Congress needs to study the impact of § 1367 on the Burford, Pullman,
and Colorado River abstention doctrines, which it may have inadvertently
affected in 1990. It should take account of that impact and determine whether the
abstention doctrines should be affected by the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.
Since these abstention doctrines are judicially created, like supplemental
jurisdiction before the enactment of the 1990 statute, a congressional study of
them would dovetail with a reexamination of § 1367.
IV. CONCLUSION

While the enactment of § 1367 has had many salutary effects and should be
applauded, the passage of over eight years since its adoption may be an
appropriate interval to reevaluate its scope and content. Although the legislative
process in 1990 was necessarily truncated, it should not be so on this occasion.
To be sure, the current statute has much to commend it; there is now time to make
it better. The ALI should target early 1999 for submitting its proposal to
Congress for revising § 1367. Any further adjustments the ALI may wish to make

102. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966).
103. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why AlienageJurisdiction?HistoricalFoundationsandModern
Justificationsfor FederalJurisdictionOver DisputesInvolving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 4 (1996) (stating that historical evidence discloses that "alienage jurisdiction differs in
salient respects from ordinary diversity jurisdiction").
104. Wythe Holt, The OriginsofAlienage Jurisdiction,14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 547, 548
(1989); see also Wythe Holt, "To EstablishJustice":Politics,The JudiciaryAct of 1789, and
the Invention of the FederalCourts, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1421; Charles Warren, New Light on the
History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923).
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in its proposal can be undertaken during the give and take of the legislative
process. After all, this time around the Judiciary Committees will undoubtedly
hold as many hearings as are necessary to explore all the issues thoroughly. Too
much delay beyond early 1999 may result in lost momentum for legislative
change. To restate an old adage: the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.
Finally, the ALI and others should not prejudge the congressional outcome.
Speaking from personal experience, it is always difficult to predict what proposal
will or will not receive a warm welcome in the legislature. As scholars, teachers,
and practitioners, we should offer the Congress our very best judgments on the
scope and content of a supplemental-jurisdiction statute. Nothing less is expected.
The members of Congress are perfectly capable of making any appropriate
political judgment; that is their role, not ours.

